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Abstract: Is public opinion on global climate change stable, with
voters holding deeply rooted attitudes that guide them to 
consistent policy positions?  Or is public opinion malleable, with 
voters adjusting their environmental positions when they learn 
about the positions of political leaders?  To explore whether 
leaders can influence mass opinion on climate change, we 
conduct a pair of survey experiments in Australia.  Emissions 
trading plans and renewable energy targets have been central 
issues in Australian politics over the last decade, with the 
members of the major parties deeply polarized on these issues.  
Our experiments reveal that survey respondents take different 
positions on climate change policy when they learn what 
positions leaders hold.  When respondents learn that leaders 
take divergent positions on addressing climate change, they 
become more polarized along party lines.  But when leaders 
converge on a policy proposal, they also bring those who follow 
them into closer agreement, providing evidence that partisan 
polarization at the mass level can be overcome when leaders 
come together on environmental policies.  
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Parker, Karlsson and Hjerpe (2015, 435) maintain that ‘[W]hen 
confronting complex global problems, such as the climate change challenge, 
in which the stakes are high and solutions can be blocked by collective 
action problems, leadership is essential.  Leadership can make a decisive 
difference by providing a model others may want to emulate…’  However, 
leadership has the potential not only to unite, but also divide public opinion 
over issues such as climate change.  Where there is an absence of political 
consensus within countries, the implementation of policy to effectively 
address climate change is bound to falter.  In many countries, including the 
USA (e.g. Wood and Vedlitz 2007; Jacques et al. 2008; McCright and Dunlap 
2010, 2011; Hamilton 2011, Hamilton et al. 2015), Great Britain (e.g. 
Poortinga et al. 2011), Australia (e.g. Tranter 2011, 2014, 2017; Fielding et 
al. 2012) and elsewhere (Tranter and Booth 2015), deep political divisions 
exist over the veracity of anthropogenic climate change.  In the United 
States, for example, Dunlap (2014, 2) argues that conservative political 
leaders contribute to ‘distrust in climate science and other environmental 
sciences, and environmental scepticism in general, among lay conservatives 
who take their cues from trusted political leaders’.  
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We are particularly interested in the influence political leaders have 
upon their constituents in relation to climate change.  Lewis-Beck et al. 
(2011, 166) argue that political leaders can influence their respective party 
identifiers by providing ‘cues’ that help their followers negotiate complex 
political issues.  Yet as Gilens and Murakawa (2001, 43) point out, ‘while elite
cues can provide an efficient shortcut to political decision making, the extent
to which they are used and their effectiveness as a substitute for substantive
knowledge remain unclear.’  To our knowledge, the nature of this political 
leader-follower relationship has not been elucidated when it comes to 
climate change.  We seek to address this issue by considering the Australian 
case, as it offers a unique opportunity to empirically examine the influence of
national political leaders upon partisan attitudes on climate change.  
In Australia, conservative politicians (Fielding et al. 2011) and 
conservative political candidates (Tranter 2013) are far less likely than 
progressive politicians to agree that anthropogenic climate change is 
occurring, or that strong action should be taken to address climate change.  
Fielding and her colleagues (2012) surveyed Australian politicians to 
examine the lack of political consensus over climate change.  They found 
political affiliation strongly differentiates climate change beliefs, and that 
Labor and Greens politicians are far closer to the scientific consensus 
position on anthropogenic climate change than are conservative Liberal or 
National party politicians.  Tranter (2011, 2013) argued that political leaders 
influence the attitudes of their respective partisans when it comes to 
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environmental issues, particularly in relation to global warming and climate 
change.  Analysing survey data from Australian political candidates and 
voters, he found that positive evaluations of national Labor leaders were 
associated with greater concern over global warming, while positive 
evaluations of conservative coalition leaders were negatively associated with
global warming attitudes (Tranter 2013).  
Yet neither Fielding et al. (2012) nor Tranter (2011, 2013) were able to 
demonstrate a causal relationship, that leaders actually influence voter 
attitudes on climate change.  While their findings are important for 
understanding polarization on climate change, Fielding et al.’s (2012) study 
was limited to an assessment of politicians’ attitudes toward climate change.
Further, although Tranter (2013) found associations between leader 
evaluations and climate change attitudes, and posits an association between
political leaders and partisan attitudes, his research based upon cross 
sectional survey data could not demonstrate a causal relationship between 
leader cues and public attitudes.  Our research constitutes an attempt to 
address this gap in the literature. 
Why is public opinion on climate change so often polarized along party 
lines?  Is the divide created by deeply rooted and unwavering divisions 
between groups of voters1 who take divergent positions, and then chose to 
support leaders who match their views (thus giving strategic politicians an 
1 Note that we use “voters” here rather than poll respondents because, with Australia’s 
system of mandatory voting, nearly all of the respondents to the 2015-16 AUSSA poll 
reported voting in the last national election (94% voted; 3% did not vote and 3% were 
ineligible at the last election).  
4
incentive to go where the votes are)?  Or is public opinion on the 
environment much more malleable, with voters looking to elected officials to 
help inform their policy choices?  In other words, do leaders respond to voter 
demands when crafting their party platforms, or, when it comes to 
addressing climate change, do voters follow their leaders?   
If leaders simply respond to divisions between groups of voters, then 
voter sentiment on environmental policy should be quite static.  Members of 
major parties will hold divergent views and will not shift their positions when 
they learn about where party leaders stand.  The congruence between mass 
and elite opinion will come as a result of politicians courting voters, 
according to the logic laid out in Downs’ (1957) classic account of electoral 
incentives or more recent work such as Loewen and Rubenson (2011). Voting
blocs will be immovable objects, resisting the force of political rhetoric and 
calcifying the party divide.  In this state of the world, policy gridlock will be 
likely if voters are inherently divided on the environment and neither party 
has complete control of government.
If, by contrast, voters go along with their party leaders on the complex 
issue of climate change, mass political behavior will follow a markedly 
different pattern and the prospects for policymaking will be significantly 
altered.  In this case, the congruence between voter and elite opinion comes 
because voters adjust their positions to leadership cues (Abromovitz 1978; 
Zaller 1992; Gabel and Scheve 2007; Lenz 2012; Minozzi et al. 2015).  When 
voters learn where party leaders stand on an issue, many will adjust their 
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own positions, exhibiting the behavior that Broockman and Butler 
(forthcoming) reveal in their recent field experiment.  Elected officials will 
have the ability to pull their voting blocs away from each other when leaders 
of the major parties diverge in their policy positions, but could also bring the 
electorate together on environmental policy solutions when there is an elite 
consensus.  This could lead to either gridlock or compromise, depending on 
the decisions of political leaders.
To test whether or not voters will follow leaders in the realm of global 
climate change, we conduct two survey experiments in Australia.  We 
implement these in the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (AuSSA), a 
nationally representative sample administered in four waves from late 2015 
through early 2016 (Blunsdon 2016).  By randomly assigning survey 
respondents either to receive cues about the positions of party leaders or 
not, we can credibly identify the causal impact of leadership cues (for an 
elucidation of the survey experimental approach, see Schuman and Bobo 
1988; Sniderman and Grob 1996).  We turn to Australia because of the 
unique opportunities created by the environmental positions held by top 
leaders in the right-leaning “Coalition” of the Liberal and National Parties.  
Former Prime Minister Tony Abbott opposed many actions to address the 
impact of climate change, while current Prime Minister Malcom Turnbull – a 
member of the same party, who replaced Abbott through an internal party 
vote between elections – supported many of these policies.  In one 
experiment, we test the impact of a cue about Abbott’s positions that 
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diverged from the policy favored by the leader of the opposition Labor Party, 
Bill Shorten.  The other experiment explores the effect of a consensus cue, 
informing poll respondents that Turnbull and Shorten both espoused the 
same position.        
Through both approaches, we are able to test whether many Australian
voters follow their leaders when it comes to climate change policy.  Previous 
researchers have posited leader influences in Australia (e.g. Tranter 2013), 
but there is a dearth of research that attempts to establish this association 
empirically.  In broad terms, our aim is to explore the question do national 
political leaders influence attitudes on climate change among their 
respective partisans?
I. Setting
Australia is a valuable venue in which to explore the dynamics of public
opinion on climate change for three reasons.  First, the environment has 
played a central role in Australian politics over the past decade.  The nation 
adopted an emissions trading scheme that put it at the forefront of 
comprehensive responses to climate change but then, after the public 
reaction to this policy shift played a major role in the Labor government’s 
loss in the 2013 elections, the new Coalition government reversed course 
sharply (Wanna 2014).  The environment has thus been a highly salient issue
for the Australian public.  
Second, there is a significant level of partisan polarization overall in 
the nation (see Jackman 1998, Goot 2004, Kousser 2017) and on the 
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environment in particular (Tranter 2013).  If leadership cues can accentuate 
or ameliorate polarization on the environment in a nation where this is 
already a high-profile and contentious issue, then the results of our survey 
will likely generalize to other nations in which climate change politics are not
yet as salient and party lines are not as hardened.  
Third, Australia provides, in current Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, a 
leader of the right-leaning party coalition who has taken progressive stands 
on climate change.  While this has often imperiled his personal power – his 
positions played a precipitating role in the in-party coup that removed him 
from power as the Leader of the Opposition in 2009, although did not 
prevent Turnbull from returning2 to power as Prime Minister through another 
party coup in 2016 – it provides a rare opportunity to see how voters in a 
right-leaning party respond to a leftward signal from one of their leaders on 
environmental policy.   
Australia’s recent policy moves on climate change begin in 2007, when
Labor Party Leader Kevin Rudd made the creation of an emissions trading 
scheme (ETS) a centerpiece of the campaign that led to Labor capturing the 
government in that year’s federal election.  At that point, the general idea of 
an ETS, accomplished through a market-based cap-and-trade approach, had 
bipartisan support, with Coalition Prime Minister John Howard introducing his 
own plans for an ETS before the election.  Howard called climate change, “a 
great economic challenge for Australia as well as an environmental 
2
 Miranda Devine, “Greatest Moral Challenge Turns Out to be Rudd's Dearest Folly,” Sydney 
Morning Herald, April 29, 2010.  
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challenge,”3 while Rudd termed it “the greatest moral challenge of our time.”
Yet after Rudd’s Labor government took power and began to work through 
the devilish details of a comprehensive plan to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, he began to encounter opposition both on the left and on the 
right.  Some environmental groups and leaders of the Greens Party voiced 
concerns that Rudd’s plan did not go far enough, while internal fissures 
opened up within the Liberal-National Coalition, out of government and led 
by new opposition leader Malcolm Turnbull, over whether it went too far.  
Turnbull supported an ETS and negotiated with the government on its details
in 2009, but this left him open to attack within his own caucus, termed the 
“party room” in Australia.
“We had horrific debates within the party room on climate change in 
2009.  That was the issue – whether we should have an emissions trading 
scheme or do direct action instead – that led to Malcolm Turnbull losing the 
leadership of the party,” reports Liberal Party legislator Andrew Southcott in 
an interview with one of the authors.  When asked whether this was an 
instance of politicians taking their party in a new direction on an issue, or 
instead an instance of politicians looking at where the voters were, Southcott
replied that, “This was politicians reacting to a groundswell of voters in rural 
areas who really cared about the economy.”4  With Liberals and National 
Party constituencies uncomfortable with the direction that Turnbull was 
3 Cole, Wayne, “Australia To Launch Carbon Trading Scheme by 2012,” Reuters. June 3, 
2007.
4 Interview with federal MP Andrew Southcott, Liberal Party, conducted by one of the authors
in Adelaide, South Australia, March 31, 2015.
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leading the Coalition, he faced an internal challenge for the party leadership 
and eventually lost it to Tony Abbott by a single vote in the “leadership spill” 
of December, 2009.  Another Liberal party politician who was in the party 
room when it unseated Turnbull reported that when it came to the emissions 
trading scheme, “Malcolm Turnbull had a strong conviction that we needed 
to take action, and thought he could carry the party with him.  But that put 
his leadership in jeopardy because people were pissed off that he didn’t 
listen to them, that he didn’t get the message.”5
After Tony Abbott defeated Turnbull, he turned his sights on stopping 
Rudd’s ETS proposal, deeming it a “great big tax on everything.”6  Just a day 
after he assumed the Coalition’s leadership, Abbott held nearly all of his 
party’s senators together – in alliance with the five Greens senators – to 
defeat the emissions trading scheme.7  Stymied on the left and the right, and
discouraged by the failure of the UN climate summit in Copenhagen to yield 
a global breakthrough, Rudd eventually shifted his focus away from the ETS 
in early 2010.8  That June, Prime Minister Rudd was defeated in a Labor Party
leadership spill by his Deputy Prime Minister, Julia Gillard.  She barely 
defeated Abbot in a snap election in August of 2010, forming a minority 
government with the support of a Greens senator and three independent 
5 Interview by one of the authors with a legislator who did not wish to speak with attribution 
on this topic, April 21, 2015. 
6 Phillip Chubb, “The Day the Rudd Government Lost its Way on Climate Change,” The Age, 
May 9, 2014.
7 Farr, Malcolm, “Kevin Rudd Handed Double-Dissolution Trigger as Senate Rejects 
Emissions Trading Scheme Again,” The Daily Telegraph. December 2, 2009.
8 Phillip Chubb, “The Day the Rudd Government Lost its Way on Climate Change,” The Age, 
May 9, 2014.
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MPs.  This alliance set the stage for a bolder emissions trading scheme, as 
well as other concessions to the Greens.  According to Bob Brown, the 
Parliamentary Leader of the Greens at the time, “On Election Night, [Gillard] 
called me, she needed our votes. Our deal was broader than just 
environmental issues; it included a new arrangement for Question Time, a 
national dental health scheme, and a study for high-speed rail.  This deal 
created the world’s cutting edge on climate change.”9   
Yet the deal did not last long, as Abbott made his opposition to what he
called the “carbon tax” a centerpiece of his campaign in 2013, defeating 
Labor, bringing his Coalition into power, and repealing it in July of 2014.  
Abbott’s time as Prime Minister did not last long, either; Turnbull replaced 
him in yet another leadership spill in September of 2015.  Throughout this 
period, climate change remained at the center of Australian politics.  While 
leaders often appeared to be courting voters in this policy realm, they also 
made strategic decisions when they crafted their positions on it and sought 
to bring voters along with them.  Australia moved from a bipartisan 
consensus to polarization, and dramatically shifted its global role in climate 
change policy, primarily through the knife’s edge vote to replace Turnbull 
with Abbot in 2009.  In the analysis of Senator Penny Wong, Labor’s Minister 
for Climate Change and Water at the time, “The thing that has destroyed 
bipartisanship and turned this into a rancorous issue has been the 
conservative hard-liners within the Liberal Party.  People can point to 
9 Interview with Bob Brown, former Senator for Tasmania and Parliamentary Leader of the 
Australia Greens, conducted by one of the authors on March 13, 2015, in Hobart, Tasmania.
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mistakes I made, mistakes the Labor Party made, mistakes the Greens 
made, and there are lots of those, but the fundamental driver of polarization 
on this has been the hard right of the Liberal Party and the fact that they 
tore down Turnbull because he did come to an agreement with me, and then 
they installed Abbott.” 10     
II. Hypotheses
As we laid out in our introduction, two distinct causal mechanisms 
could lead to the strong connection, observed in countries such as Australia, 
Great Britain, and the United States, between mass and elite opinion on the 
environment.  Under the office-seeking mechanism that drives Downs’ 
(1957) classic work in political science, opportunistic candidates follow 
stalwart voters by strategically adopting positions that put them in line with 
a large voting bloc.  If this is true, mass opinion on environmental policy – 
especially an issue as salient and high-stakes as climate change – should be 
unresponsive to cues from elites.  When a voter learns what position a party 
leader holds, this should not affect her own views on the policy.  Rather, it 
will only affect how she judges the leader, with the voter rewarding or 
punishing the leader based on whether the position fits with her prior 
preferences.  This theory generates an expectation of the null hypothesis in 
our experiment: if this is the case, then we should not see any treatment 
effect on our respondents when we let them know about the positions of 
party leaders.    
10 Interview with federal Senator and Leader of the Opposition in the Senate Penny Wong, 
Labor Party, conducted by one of the authors in Adelaide, South Australia on July 10, 2015.
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The second mechanism that could bring mass and elite opinion into 
alignment is leadership influence.  If voters adjust their policy positions on 
environmental issues based on signals from candidates and officeholders – if 
public opinion is malleable – then our experiments should reveal significant 
treatment effects.  This could occur through persuasive arguments made by 
leaders linking specific policies to basic values (see Chong and Druckman 
2007a, 2007b), but prior work has also shown that leaders can move voters 
simply by adopting positions (Bartels 2005; Cohen 2003; Lenz 2012; Mackie 
and Cooper 1984; Brockman and Butler, forthcoming), likely because voters 
who trust them defer to their policy expertise.  This is the mechanism that 
we test here.  While our research design does not rule out the possibility that
persuasive arguments could be perhaps even more influential, what we test 
in these survey experiments is whether simple cues about a party leaders’ 
positions can affect voter attitudes.  
In order to generate our hypotheses about how our two types of cues, 
one about diverging party positions on climate change and one about a 
bipartisan consensus, will affect polarization in the public, we draw on a 
foundational theory about how individuals respond to elite positions.  In The 
Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, Zaller (1992) builds on classic work by 
Converse (1962; 1964) on how voters form opinions, highlighting the central 
role that leaders play in this process, a role confirmed in more recent works 
by Berinsky (2009) and Lenz (2012).  
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Zaller (1992) argues that, rather than possessing a single “true 
attitude” on policy issues, individuals construct opinions by drawing on the 
range of considerations that rise to the tops of their heads.  Signals from 
elites play a key role in this process. People build their opinions, according to
Zaller, through a “Receive-Accept-Sample” model.  First, they receive 
political communications from elites.  Second, they choose whether to accept
those signals or not, selectively deciding whether to accept or resist a signal 
roughly in proportion to how much it fits with their partisanship or core 
values.  If accepted, the signal becomes internalized as a “consideration.”  
Finally, when asked in a survey to voice their policy opinions, they sample 
from all of the considerations that are prominent in their mind at the time.  
Thus, in Zaller’s model, opinion will be malleable around an underlying base 
position – elite cues can influence it, but cues will have the largest effect if 
they are consistent with an individual’s partisanship and policy 
predispositions.  
In our survey, we exert experimental control over whether respondents
receive a signal about elite positions or not.  Of course, because climate 
change policy has been such a prominent issue in recent Australian politics, 
it is entirely possible that some of the respondents in this survey already 
possessed information about each leader’s position.  But randomization 
should ensure that this information will be evenly distributed across our 
control and treatment groups, meaning that it cannot confound our findings 
and can only dampen the strength of our experimental signal, leaving us 
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even more confident of the importance of any treatment effects that we 
observe.  
The direction of this treatment effect – the response to the elite signal 
that our survey respondents receive – should depend on their underlying 
predisposition to accept it, according to Zaller’s (1992) “Receive-Accept-
Sample” model.  A respondent will be more likely to sample a different 
opinion if an elite cue comes from a source that is consistent with her own 
party affiliation or one that fits with her core policy beliefs.  The conditional 
acceptance of elite cues that Zaller demonstrates in his work generates the 
“own party influence” hypotheses that we lay out below.  
Quite simply, respondents who associate with a party or party coalition
in Australia should accept a cue from their own party’s leader, while resisting
a cue from the opposition party’s leader.  Labor Party affiliates should move 
in the direction of Labor Party leader Bill Shorten’s positions on 
environmental policy, when they learn about these positions.  Supporters of 
the Greens Party, a smaller and much more environmentally left-wing group 
that, nonetheless, often allies with Labor on environmental issues, should 
also respond to a cue from Shorten.  Those who associate with the Liberal 
Party or the Nationals Party will respond to cues from Prime Minister Tony 
Abbot, who represented the Coalition composed of those two parties, or to 
Malcolm Turnbull, the Coalition minister who replaced Abbott as Prime 
Minister by the time that the latter waves of the AUSSA survey went into the 
field.  
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Under the simplest version of our interpretation of Zaller’s theory, our 
“own party influence” hypothesis, people accept signals from their own 
party’s leaders, while resisting and thus ignoring a signal from the other 
party’s leaders.  Yet a logical extension of this theory is that a cue from the 
other party could, in fact, be an informative message that helps individuals 
take a position – they could react against the policy position favored by the 
other party’s leader.  If a respondent knows that she rarely agrees with a 
leader on the issues, and that leader adopts a clear policy position, this could
push the respondent away from the other party’s position.  This sort of “my 
enemy’s friend is my enemy” logic has been shown by Lupia (1993) to drive 
voters away from direct democracy propositions endorsed by an interest 
group that they oppose.  Opposition party leaders in Australia could play the 
same role as unpopular interest groups do in Lupia’s work.  In this polarized 
political context (see Goot 2004, Tranter 2013, Kousser 2017), learning that 
a Coalition leader favors a policy could push Labor and Greens voters away 
from it, and vice-versa.  We rely on this logic in the “other party counter-
reaction” hypothesis that we lay out below.    
Drawing upon Zaller’s (1992) theoretical framework, applied to climate
change opinion through our two specific hypothesis, we can now lay out our 
expectations about how survey respondents should react to receiving cues 
about where party leaders stand on environmental policy.  We introduce 
each experiment through the research question that it asks.  Our first 
experiment asks how respondents to the AUSSA will respond to receiving 
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cues about divergent positions taken by leaders, while the second 
experiment asks how they react to consensus cues.  For each, we first lay 
out the null hypothesis, representing the expectation that Australians hold 
firm views on these salient issues that will not change simply because they 
hear that a leader has adopted a position.  Then we lay out the expectations 
under our two alternative hypotheses.  We finish our theory section by noting
when these hypotheses yield separating predictions, and by laying out 
implications of these individual-level theories for aggregate partisan 
polarization on climate change.     
Research Question 1: Will voters take different positions if they receive a 
cue that party leaders have reached consensus on a climate change policy?
Null Hypothesis: Voters affiliated with a party will not be more likely to 
adopt the same position as their party’s leader when they receive a 
leadership cue.  
Own Party Influence Hypothesis: Voters affiliated with a party will be 
more likely to adopt the same position as their party’s leader when they 
receive a leadership cue.  The supporters of the party upon whose position 
the leaders converge will be strengthened in their leanings, while the other 
party’s leader will bring some of his or her followers to that position.  The 
treatment will lead members of both parties to be more supportive of the 
consensus position, but their parallel moves will leave overall polarization 
unchanged.  
Other Party Counter-Reaction Hypothesis: Voters affiliated with a party 
will be more likely to adopt the opposite position from the other party’s 
leader when they receive a leadership cue.  The supporters of the party upon
whose position the leaders converge will become less supportive of that 
position when they learn that the other party’s leader adopts it, while 
members of the other party will also move away from it through the same 
logic.  The treatment will lead members of both parties to be less supportive 
of the consensus position, but their parallel moves will leave overall 
polarization unchanged.  
Research Question 2: Will voters take different positions if they receive a 
cue that party leaders diverge on a climate change policy?
17
Null Hypothesis: Voters will not be affected by a leadership cue, with 
the treatment group taking the same positions as respondents in the control 
group.
Own Party Influence Hypothesis: Voters affiliated with a party will be 
more likely to adopt the same position as their party’s leader when they 
receive a leadership cue.  As polarized leaders pull their supporters apart in 
the treatment condition, respondents will become more polarized along party
lines.
Other Party Counter-Reaction Hypothesis: Voters affiliated with a party 
will be more likely to adopt the opposite position from the other party’s 
leader when they receive a leadership cue.  As polarized leaders push 
members of the other party away from them in the treatment condition, 
respondents will become more polarized along party lines.
Our setting allows us to explore both questions, because Australian 
leaders converged on one major environmental policy and diverged on 
another.  At the time the surveys were administered, both Bill Shorten and 
Malcolm Turnbull had expressed support for an emissions trading scheme.  In
this case of bipartisan support, we expect that respondents will exhibit 
different opinions on emissions trading when they learn about leadership 
positions, though the direction of the effect will depend upon whether voters’
adherence to their own party’s leader is stronger than their counter-reaction 
to the position of the other party’s leader.  By contrast, we have clear 
expectations about how respondents will react when they receive a 
divergent cue.  During our study, a clear political division was apparent 
between Labor (represented by Bill Shorten), which supported maintaining 
the renewable energy target (RET), and the Liberal and National party 
coalition partners (represented by Tony Abbot), which favored reducing the 
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target.11  We expect that learning about this disagreement between major 
party leaders will influence environmental attitudes.  In this case, we expect 
Labor and coalition partisans to be more polarized in their attitudes toward 
the RET when they learn about the leaders’ positions, either because they 
move toward their own party’s policy view or because they move away from 
the other party’s position.  
It is important to note that in our divergent cues experiment, both the 
own party influence hypothesis and the other party counter-reaction 
hypothesis yield the same empirical prediction, but through different 
mechanisms.  A divergent cue may pull voters from each party to the 
extremes as they follow their own leaders, or learning about the other party 
may push voters away from the other side.  Increased polarization along 
party lines is the result of either mechanism.  But in the convergent cues 
experiment, these forces point in different directions.  The convergence cue 
could attract members of both parties toward the position that both leaders 
converge upon, or their positions could repel members of both parties away 
11 There is a potentially confounding factor relating to our survey question on the renewable 
energy target, where Tony Abbott is named as Prime Minister.  Mr. Abbott was Prime 
Minister from 18 September 2013 until September 15, 2015 until deposed by Malcolm 
Turnbull.  Data in the 2015 Australian Survey of Social Attitudes were collected between 
August 17, 2015 and April 14, 2016, so for approximately the first month of data collection, 
Tony Abbott was Prime Minister, while for the remainder of the collection period Malcolm 
Turnbull held the top job.  Tony Abbott was very unpopular during his term as PM, 
particularly toward the end of his leadership.  Yet even though Abbott was unpopular, his 
rejection of an RTS is likely to have resonated with many coalition voters who viewed 
support for the renewable energy target as poor policy that would hinder economic growth.
We suspect that if the leadership change from Tony Abbott to Malcolm Turnbull is a 
confounding factor, Abbott’s unpopularity may have attenuated the leader effect we 
detected on our RTS measure, such that the magnitude of the effect we detected is a 
conservative estimate.
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from that position through a counter-reaction.  Positions will shift but overall 
polarization will be unchanged in both of these scenarios.  
III. Method
We employ a split sample experimental design using data from the 
2015 Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (AuSSA).  The AuSSA is a mail-out,
mail-back survey based upon a sample systematically selected from the 
Australian Electoral Roll, with 5,000 questionnaires administered and 1,211 
completed questionnaires returned (317 were ineligible as not at address or 
deceased), resulting in an AAPOR Response Rate 1 of 25.8 percent. 
Survey participants were randomly assigned two different AuSSA 
questionnaires.  One sub-sample of respondents were mailed questionnaires 
containing survey items that named national political leaders, outlining the 
policy positions espoused by party leaders.  The remaining respondents 
received identical questions with no mention of the leaders.  The two sets of 
questionnaire items over which we exerted experimental control are of 
interest for our research.  The first (1A and 1B below) relate to a proposed 
emissions trading scheme (ETS).  
Leadership Consensus Cue
Questions 1A and 1B were designed to measure the influence of 
consensus leader positions on a climate change related issue. 
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Question 1A. (without cue) ‘We would like to know what you think 
about the proposal to create an emissions trading scheme in order to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. Do you support or oppose this proposal?’
Question 1B. (with cue) “We would like to know what you think about 
the proposal to create an emissions trading scheme in order to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. Both Labor Party leader Bill Shorten and Liberal 
Party Minister Malcolm Turnbull have favored this approach. Do you support 
or oppose this proposal?’
The response categories for both questions were 1. Support the 
proposal; 2. Oppose the proposal.  The consensus cue dependent variable 
scores ‘support’ as 0 and ‘oppose’ as 1 for binary logistic regression 
analyses.
Leadership Divergence Cue 
We also included an item designed to measure the influence of 
national leaders upon partisans when the leaders were divided over a 
climate related policy.  
Question 2A. (without cue) “Australia’s Renewable Energy Target sets 
a goal for the amount of power that will be supplied through solar, wind, and 
other renewable resources by the year 2020. There have been recent 
proposals to reduce this target, relying less on renewable resources in order 
to keep power costs low.  What is your position on this policy?”
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Question 2B. (with cue) “Australia’s Renewable Energy Target sets a 
goal for the amount of power that will be supplied through solar, wind, and 
other renewable resources by the year 2020. Labor Party leader Bill Shorten 
has supported keeping this target at its current level, while Tony Abbott’s 
Coalition government have proposed a reduced target, relying less on 
renewable resources in order to keep power costs low.  What is your position 
on this policy?”
The response categories for questions 2A and 2B were: 1. Keep the 
renewable energy target at its current level; 2. Reduce the renewable energy
target.  The divergence cue dependent variable scores ‘reduce’ as 1 and 
‘retain’ as 0 for binary logistic regression analyses.
As an omnibus social attitude survey, the AuSSA also contains other 
data relevant to our analysis, including questions on political partisanship 
and demographic questions from which we derive our independent 
variables.  The political party identification question that appears in the 
AuSSA is ‘Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political 
party and, if yes, which party is that?’ (Responses: Labor Party [ALP]; Liberal 
Party; National [Country] Party; Greens; No party affiliation; Other party 
[please specify]).  
After analyzing the experimental effect of leadership cues, we estimate
multivariate models in order to leverage the broader data available in this 
survey.  Four models are presented for our binary logistic regression 
analyses.  The first estimates the influence of leaders (i.e. Leaders Cue) on 
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partisan attitudes.  The second model adds a party identification scale that is
scored 1 Greens 2 Labor; 3 no party affiliation; 4 Coalition party identification
and centered at the mean.  Model 3 adds an interaction term for the political 
party ID scale by Leader Cue variable.  Finally, Model 4 controls for attitudes 
toward anthropogenic climate change (‘Climate change is happening now 
and is mainly caused by human activities’ scored 1; other responses scored 
0).  Appendix Table 3 contains Pearson’s correlations for the dependent and 
independent variables.
We control for sex and age in regression analyses as these have been 
found to influence attitudes toward climate change in Australia (Tranter 
2011, 2017; Fielding et al 2012).  We use binary logistic regression to 
analyse our binary dependent variables.  This approach enables a more 
precise examination of question wording effects by reducing overall 
estimation errors and by holding constant characteristics that could still 
slightly vary across the treatment and control groups, even after 
randomization.
IV. Results
Our central findings are that: (1) Consistent with prior research in a 
range of nations (see Wood and Vedlitz 2007; Jacques et al. 2008; McCright 
and Dunlap 2010, 2011; Hamilton 2011, Poortinga et al. 2011; Tranter 2011, 
2014, 2017; Fielding et al. 2012; Hamilton et al. 2015; Tranter and Booth 
2015), public opinion on key climate change issues in Australia is strongly 
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polarized along party lines.  Those who affiliate with the coalition of the 
Liberal and the Nationals Parties are much less supportive of emissions 
trading schemes or renewable energy targets than voters affiliated with the 
Labor or especially the Greens. (2) When survey respondents are exposed to 
a cue reporting that party leaders diverge in their positions, this polarization 
along partisan lines is accentuated.  When they learn, by contrast, that 
leaders converge, those who affiliate with opposing parties take positions 
that are closer together. (3) The impact of the leadership cue can sometimes
be attributed to voters adopting their own party leaders’ positions, but in 
other cases appears to be counter-reaction in which they take positions that 
set them apart from the other party’s leaders.   
We begin by presenting the results graphically, then move to full 
multivariate tests.  Appendices 1 and 2 provide additional detail on the exact
results of the bivariate effects we present in Figures 1 and 2, included 
Fischer’s exact tests.  Those tests show, and the figures graphically display, 
that – when no cues are given – survey respondents take very different 
positions on these environmental policies based on the parties that they 
support.  Labor and Greens affiliates strongly favor the renewable energy 
target and emissions trading scheme, while voters in the Liberal-Nationals 
coalition are less supportive.  The differences between these two sets of 
parties in the absence of a cue are significant at the 95% confidence levels.  
They are also consistent with the general alignment of Greens, Labor, and 
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coalition voters along the left-to-right ideological spectrum for a broad range 
of policy areas reported in Kousser (2017).
In the critical test of our convergence hypothesis, the results in Figure 
1 also suggest that coalition identifiers are more supportive of an emissions 
trading scheme when they learn that leaders of both parties agree on that 
scheme.  When federal Labor Opposition Leader Bill Shorten and coalition 
Minister (later Prime Minister) Malcolm Turnbull are named as supportive of 
the emissions trading scheme, 58% of coalition identifiers support the 
scheme, compared to 49% when leaders are not mentioned.  The percentage
difference among coalition identifiers between the samples supports our 
hypothesis that political leaders influence climate change attitudes.  These 
voters move in the direction predicted by the “own party influence” 
hypothesis.
However, in contrast to coalition supporters, Labor and Greens 
identifiers were less likely to support an emissions trading scheme when 
political leaders were named in support of the question on emissions 
trading.  Australians who identify with the Labor party were twice as likely to 
oppose an emissions trading scheme (20%) under a consensus position 
between party leaders, compared to where they were not named (10%).  
Support among Greens identifiers also declines by eight percentage points.  
While this finding is at first glance surprising, the effect among Labor and 
Greens is consistent with the “other party counter-reaction” hypothesis.  For 
respondents who did not learn of the leader’s positions, support for the 
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emissions trading scheme was exceptionally high (97% among Greens and 
90% among Labor identifiers).  Hearing that Bill Shorten supported the 
scheme could not increase the level of support in the treatment group by 
much, since there was hardly any room for an increase.  But it appears that 
learning that the scheme was supported by Malcolm Turnbull led left-wing 
respondents to conclude that it was not as environmentally progressive as 
they might have thought, leading some to oppose what looked – through the 
lens of leadership cues – like a centrist proposal.  
It also comforting to note that learning about the leadership cues had 
no impact on the views of survey respondents who professed no party 
affiliation.  These voters act as a “placebo group” in our experiments 
because they should not be influenced by the cues.  In both survey 
experiments, support for environmental policies was virtually identical 
among the treatment and control groups for this “No Party” voters.  The fact 
that such voters did not respond to cues from leaders whose parties they 
feel no allegiance to is perfectly consistent with Zaller’s (1992) theory that 
voters who receive a signal only accept it if it falls in line with their existing 
partisan affiliations or other values.  With no partisan affiliations, these 
voters were unmoved by cues from party leaders.   
Figure 2 shows leader cue effects on responses to the question on the 
renewable energy target for 2020.  In this instance, the Prime Minister at the 
time the survey was administered (Tony Abbott) favored reducing the 
renewable energy target, while the Opposition leader (Bill Shorten) favored 
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leaving the target unchanged.  There was therefore a clear political divide 
between the major party policy platforms over this issue.  
The results here indicate that coalition party identifiers were far less 
likely to favor retaining the RET when leaders were named (54%) compared 
to when leaders’ names were not mentioned (70%).  This is in line with our 
hypothesis that leader divergence influences partisans, either through the 
own party support or the other party counter-reaction hypotheses (both of 
which point in the same direction in this experiment.  The effect is stronger 
among coalition identifiers that it is among Labor or Greens partisans on this 
question.  Support among Greens is four percentage points higher, and Labor
support is two points higher, when these voters learn that Shorten favors and
Abbott opposes retaining the RET.  
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Figure 1. The Impact of Leader Consensus Cues
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Figure 2. The Impact of Leader Divergence Cues
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Notes: Both figures report data from survey experiments, with 1147 
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valid observations (for Figure 1) and 1,099 valid observations (for 
Figure 2)
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Multivariate Analyses
We model two dichotomous dependent variables.  The first contrasts 
those who oppose an emissions trading scheme with supporters of the 
scheme. It is based on the question “We would like to know what you think 
about the proposal to create an Emissions Trading Scheme in order to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. Do you support or oppose this proposal?,” with 
support scored as 0 and opposition as 1.  The model reported in Table 3 
examines the influence of a consensus cue in the multivariate case.  
“Leaders Cue” is a dummy variable scored 1 for the sub-sample where 
leaders were named and 0 in the sample where leader names were omitted. 
For Table 3, the question presented both leaders (Shorten and Turnbull) as 
supportive of the ETS.  We expect that with bipartisanship among leaders 
(i.e. leaders are named), partisan differences on the ETS should be 
attenuated, compared to when leader names are omitted from the survey 
question.  
Of most interest here is the interaction result.  The results for this 
variable tests our first research question, whether voters take different 
positions if they receive a cue that party leaders have reached consensus on 
a climate change policy (i.e. convergence model, Table 3, Model 3).  The 
interaction variable allows different partisans to move in different directions 
and measures the overall impact of leadership cues on partisan polarization.i 
The party ID * leader cue interaction term is statistically significant (p 
= .016), with an odds ratio of 0.6 indicating an average 60 per cent decrease
30
in opposition to an emissions trading scheme across the levels of the party 
identification variable.   The main effect for political party identification are 
statistically significant (p <.0001) with an odds ratio of 2.69.  This indicates 
an increase of 2.7 times the odds of opposing an emissions trading scheme 
for a unit change on the party ID scale (i.e. moving from Greens to Labor, to 
No party to Coalition).  The results are represented visually in Figure 3, 
where the probability of opposing an emissions trading scheme increases for 
the Greens and Labor and slightly for the politically non-aligned, but is 
reduced for Coalition identifiers under conditions of leadership convergence. 
After controlling for climate change attitudes in Model 4, the party ID by 
leader cue interaction is just short of significance (p = .070).  The magnitude 
of the odds ratios for climate attitudes indicates believing that anthropogenic
climate change is occurring substantially reduces opposition to an emissions 
trading scheme, although strong partisan main effects remain.12
In Table 4, we model a different scenario, the influence of divergence 
between national leaders over a policy designed to attenuate climate 
change, the renewable energy target.  These analyses test our second 
research question, whether voters take different positions if they receive a 
cue that party leaders diverge on a climate change policy?  In this case, our 
dependent variable measures if Australians prefer retaining the RET (scored 
0) or reducing the target (scored 1).  Here the leaders cue variable measures
12 Controlling for age and sex, the leader cue variable does not exceed statistical 
significance at the 95% level in any of the models.  However, note that this coefficient – 
which would only be significant if all voters moved in the same direction no matter which 
party they identified with – does not constitute the main test of our hypotheses, which 
predicts different effects for different partisans.
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the influence of leaders where there is divergence between the major parties
over climate policy.  
The divergence model (i.e. Table 4, Model 3), shows the party ID * 
leader cue interaction term is statistically significant (p .016), with the odds 
ratio 1.6 indicating an average 60 per cent increase in support for reducing 
the renewable energy target across the party identification variable.  This 
pattern is represented visually in Figure 4, where the probability of reducing 
the renewable energy target is slightly lower for Greens and Labor when 
there are diverging leader cues, slightly higher for non-partisans, but 
considerably higher for coalition identifiers under conditions of divergence.  
The main effects for political party identification are statistically significant (p
<.0001) with the odds ratio of 1.53 suggesting an increase of 53 per cent in 
the odds of reducing the renewable energy target for a unit change in party 
ID.  Further, controlling for believing in the veracity of anthropogenic climate 
change does not reduce the significance of the party ID * leader cue 
interaction.  In fact, Model 4 suggests a slightly stronger effect (OR 1.9; p = 
0.004) for the interaction term after holding climate change attitudes 
constant, suggesting this is a robust finding.
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Table 3: Consensus Cue ‘We would like to know what you think about the proposal to create an Emissions Trading
Scheme in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Do you support or oppose this proposal?’ Support =0; 
Oppose =1 (odds ratios).
Model 1 2 3 4
OR p OR P OR P OR P
Men 1.8 (<.0001) 1.8 (<.0001) 1.8 (<.0001) 1.5 (.009)
Age (years) 1.022 (<.0001) 1.016 (<.0001) 1.016 (.001) 1.011 (.024)
Leaders Cue 1.1 (.627) 1.1 (.619) 1.2 (.251) 1.1 (.454)
Party ID scale - - 2.08 (<.0001) 2.69 (<.0001) 2.07 (<.0001)
Interaction (Party ID * 
Cue)
- - - - 0.6 (.016) 0.7 (.070)
Believe ACC is occurring - - - - - - 0.2 (<.0001)
Nagelkerke R2 .06 - .15 - .16 - .33 -
N (1,009) (1,009) (1,009) (1,001)
 
Notes: analysis restricted to Greens, Labor, Coalition and No Party identifiers.  Party ID scored 1 Greens; 2 Labor; 3 No Party; 4 
Coalition, and centered at the mean.  Other party identifiers excluded.
Source: Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (2015) Data are weighted.
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Table 4: Divergence Cue ‘Australia's Renewable Energy Target sets a goal for the amount of power that will be 
supplied through solar, wind, and other renewable resources by the year 2020.  What is your position on this 
policy?’  Reduce =1; Retain =0 (odds ratios).
Model 1 2 3 4
OR p OR P OR P OR P
Men 1.3 (.077) 1.3 (.085) 1.3 (.065) 1.1 (.463)
Age (years) 1.017 (<.0001) 1.011 (.021) 1.012 (.016) 1.008 (.117)
Leaders Cue 1.3 (.113) 1.3 (.102) 1.1 (.461) 1.1 (.515)
Party ID scale - - 1.97 (<.0001) 1.53 (.003) 1.22 (<.187)
Interaction (Party ID * 
Cue)
- - - - 1.6 (.016) 1.9 (.004)
Believe ACC is occurring - - - - - - 0.3 (<.0001)
Nagelkerke R2 .03 - .10 - .11 - .19 -
N (1,002) (1,002) (1,002) (993)
 
Notes: analysis restricted to Greens, Labor, Coalition and No Party identifiers.  Party ID scored 1 Greens; 2 Labor; 3 No Party; 4 
Coalition, then centered at the mean.  Other party identifiers excluded.
Source: Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (2015) Data are weighted.
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V. Conclusion
To explore the effect of leadership cues on public polarization on climate 
change issues, we conducted a survey experiment using the 2015 Australian 
Survey of Social Attitudes (AuSSA). Respondents were randomly assigned 
either to receive cues about the positions of party leaders on climate policies
or not to receive them, allowing us to identify the causal impact of leadership
cues (see Schuman and Bobo 1988; Sniderman and Grob 1996) on attitudes 
toward climate change policy.  We cannot definitively rule out the possibility 
that politicians strategically adopt policy positions that conform to the 
positions of voters.  However, by evaluating whether voters are responsive to
elite cues in this realm, we test for a critical and necessary assumption of the
theory that, in environmental politics, party polarization is strengthened by 
voters following their leaders.  While previous researchers posited leader 
influences in Australia (e.g. Tranter 2011, 2013), we demonstrate this 
association empirically, finding national political leaders do influence 
partisan attitudes, with Australian voters following their party leaders when it
comes to global climate change policies.  
Our research design allows us to discover whether partisan polarization is 
a fixed and inevitable feature of environmental politics.  If divergent leaders 
can pull their electoral bases apart from each other on controversial policies, 
polarization is not inescapable.  Malleable voters will follow their leaders in 
any direction; if elites reach a consensus, their supporters could also 
converge toward the center, promising a path out of gridlock on critical 
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questions of environmental policy.  Once informed of the positions party 
leaders took on two hotly debated climate related policies, survey 
respondents adopted positions that were substantively and statistically 
different to those made by the voters who did not receive cues.  When 
leaders express divergent positions, voter polarization increases.  However, 
under conditions of elite consensus, voter polarization decreases.  The 
implications for policy action on climate change are important, as these 
findings suggest that agreements between party leaders may help overcome
gridlock on climate policy.   
Public opinion about addressing climate change, we show, is not 
immutable.  What implications does this finding hold for the future direction 
of policy change in this critical area?  Departing from the same starting point
as important research by Guber (2013) and by McCright et al. (2014) on 
partisan sorting, our findings may suggest a brighter policy future.  Guber 
(2013, 109) writes that “partisan conflicts are not inherent in the subject of 
climate change. Party sorting seems to occur only as citizens acquire 
information and become familiar with elite cues. Unfortunately, it also means
that the well-intentioned efforts of [Al] Gore and others on initiatives such as 
WeCanSolveIt.org and the Climate Reality Project—which are predicated on 
the assumption that awareness generates concern—may ultimately fall flat.” 
We agree that left-wing leaders may not be able to shift the views of 
conservative voters, but show that conservative leaders may indeed have 
that power.  Now that he has unseated Tony Abbott as Australia’s Prime 
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Minister, Malcolm Turnbull may be able to move members of his Coalition 
toward different environmental stances. Other leaders might follow the 
example of Arnold Schwarzenegger; when he served as the Republican 
governor of California, his embrace of a bill setting aggressive targets to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions helped to secure his reelection and 
changed environmental politics across the states (Chandler and Kousser, 
2007).  He demonstrated that a member of his party could survive, and 
indeed reap electoral rewards, for taking an environmentalist stance.  Our 
results suggest that one reason he was so successful is that he may have 
persuaded some Republican voters to follow him rather than simply to 
tolerate his bold policy move.   
Elected officials are certainly not the only source of elite cues that 
voters receive in today’s politics.  Media reports and campaign messages 
remain critical parts of the modern information environment, and the 2016 
presidential election in the United States laid bare just how polarized and 
polarizing media outlets such as Breitbart News can be.  The findings of 
Carmichael et al. (2007, 611) “point to the powerful role that partisan media 
plays in reinforcing and strengthening opposition or support of climate 
change action. This would imply that to have appreciable shifts in aggregate 
public concern over climate change, the level, nature, and audience reach of 
media coverage would need to significantly shift (Carmichael et al 2017, 
611).”  Our results do nothing to challenge the importance of the media, and 
many prominent media members could be thought of as “elites” on a par 
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with elected officials.  What we do show is that even if this fractured and 
polarized media environment, politicians’ messages can still exert powerful 
effects to either divide or unite their followers.  
Public opinion on environmental policy may inform and constrain 
leaders, but it does not dictate their positions or their policymaking options.  
Today, viewpoints on the environment are highly polarized along party lines 
in the United States (Wood and Vedlitz 2007; Jacques et al. 2008; McCright 
and Dunlap 2010, 2011; Hamilton 2011, Guber 2013, McWright et al. 2014, 
Hamilton et al. 2015, Carmichael et al 2017), Great Britain (e.g. Poortinga et 
al. 2011), Australia (e.g. Tranter 2011, 2014, 2017; Fielding et al. 2012) and 
elsewhere (Tranter and Booth 2015).  On the other hand, as Hamilton (2017) 
shows, there has been a gradual increase in acceptance of climate change in
the United States over the past seven years.  Neither dynamic of public 
opinion, we would argue, guarantees a future policy direction.  Leaders can 
influence public opinion, giving them the electoral leeway to make dramatic 
policy shifts.  Recent years have seen Australia change the direction of its 
approach to global climate change and the United States, under President 
Trump’s leadership, move away from the Paris Agreement.  Yet the next 
leader of each nation may shift directions again, bringing along his or her 
followers.  No victory in this policy realm is secure, we have seen, but our 
results also suggest that no loss is forever.  Whether public opinion on the 
environment remains polarized or moves toward a consensus is up to both 
voters and leaders.     
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Appendix Table 1: Consensus Cue ‘We would like to know what you think about the proposal to create an 
Emissions Trading Scheme in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Do you support or oppose this 
proposal?’ (per cent).
All Coalition ALP Greens No Party ID
Leaders No cue Cue No cue Cue No cue Cue No cue Cue No cue Cue
Support 69.9 70.6 49.0 57.9 89.3 79.6 96.9 88.4 74.1 71.
6
Oppose 30.1 29.4 51.0 42.1 10.7 20.4 3.1 11.6 25.9 28.
4
N (600) (547) (155) (152) (112) (98) (32) (43) (239) (20
1)
2 sided 
Fischer’
s Exact 
P 
.791 .137 .057 .213 .591
Appendix Table 2: Divergence Cue ‘Australia's Renewable Energy Target sets a goal for the amount of power that 
will be supplied through solar, wind, and other renewable resources by the year 2020’ What is your position on 
this policy? (per cent).
All Coalition ALP Greens No Party ID
Leaders No cue Cue No cue Cue No cue Cue No cue Cue No cue Cue
Retain 79.8 76.1 69.9 54.3 82.4 84.2 93.8 97.7 83.5 84.
3
Reduce 20.2 23.9 30.1 45.7 17.6 15.8 6.3 2.3 16.5 15.
7
N (585) (514) (155) (152) (119) (101) (32) (43) (237) (19
7)
2 sided 
Fischer’
s Exact 
P 
.144 .007 .857 .572 .896
Appendix Table 3: Dependent and Independent variables (Pearson’s correlations).
Oppose 
ETS
Reduce 
RET
Men Age Leader 
Cue
Party ID ACC 
Happening
Oppose ETS 1
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Reduce RET .35** 1
Men .15** .07* 1
Age .17** .13** .02 1
Leader Cue .008 .05 -.02 .003 1
Party ID .27** .23** .03 .20** -.002 1
ACC 
Happening
-.48** -.31** -.16** -.17** -.006 -.27** 1
Notes: * p <.05; ** p <.01
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i  Political party identification is measured as an ordinal variable (Greens =1; Labor =2; No party =3; 
Coalition [Liberals + Nationals] =4).  We also examined models where party identification was measured with
dummy variables, yielding substantively similar results. Similar to Hamilton et al. (2015), we use the more 
parsimonious party identification ordinal variable as we are interested in modelling leader cue interactions 
across the party identification gradient, as opposed to contrasting individual parties.
